【摘要】 公司民主体制、股东会控制的需要以及董事义务理论,均支持董事无因解任制度。我国的董事无因解任制度与累积投票制度存在冲突,本质上是大股东与中小股东的利益冲突。借鉴美国、日本做法,我国无因解任制度的完善应抑制无因解任而鼓励累积投票,对无因解任制度本身做出限制,以衔接累积投票制度。立法上应明确禁止无因解任累积投票选举的董事,发挥章程的自治作用,限制董事解任的次数,区分有因解任与无因解任,以及禁止变相地解任董事。更多还原

【Abstract】 The democratic system of the company,the need of the control of the shareholders’ meeting and the theory of the directors’ obligation all support the system of the directors’ removal without cause. In China,there is a conflict between the system of directors’ removal without cause and the system of cumulative voting,which is essentially a conflict of interest between large shareholders and small and medium shareholders. Referring to the practice of the United States and Japan,the perfection of directors’ removal without cause in China should restrain the removal system and encourage the cumulative voting,and restrict the removal system to connect the cumulative voting system. In legislation,it should be clearly prohibited to dismiss directors by cumulative voting,to play the role of autonomy of the articles of association. The number of dismissals of directors should be limited. Differ the distinction between dismissals with or without cause,and prohibit the removal of directors in disguise.更多还原