【摘要】 文章基于不完全合约理论和"委托—代理"理论,通过对西双版纳纳板河流域天然橡胶割胶环节的雇佣合约的分析,探讨通过选择专门的合约治理形式来降低合约中的交易成本,提高合约的稳定性。研究发现,天然橡胶割胶环节的雇佣合约既是一种不完全合约,又是一种委托代理合约,交易成本和代理人的机会主义行为是影响雇佣合约稳定性的最主要原因。割胶活动具有强专用资产的特点,为保证合约的稳定性,需要为合约安装安全措施。对于合约的不完全性导致的合约不稳定,通过选择专门的合约治理形式来保证雇佣合约的稳定性,即分成制的工资合约形式,在合约中规定以最终收益的比例作为支付工资的标准;在雇佣合约中设计激励机制来规避代理人的事后机会主义行为,通过分成制的工资形式,让渡委托人部分剩余索取权来激励代理人的努力程度,降低监督成本。更多还原

【Abstract】 Based on the incomplete contract theory and the principal-agent theory, this paper analyzes the employment contract of the natural rubber tapping in the Banhe River Basin of Xishuangbanna, and discusses how to reduce the transaction cost in the contract and improve the stability of the contract by choosing a special form of contract governance. The study finds that the employment contract of natural rubber tapping is both an incomplete contract and a principal-agent contract. Transaction costs and the opportunistic behavior of the agent are the most important reasons that affect the stability of the employment contract. Rubber tapping is characteristic of strong specific assets. In order to ensure the stability of the contract, it is necessary to install security measures for the contract. For the instability of the contract caused by the incompleteness of the contract, the stability of the employment contract is ensured by selecting a special form of contract, i.e. a sharecropping salary contract, which specifies the proportion of the final income as the standard for paying wages. The employment contract includes an incentive mechanism to circumvent the agent’s post-opportunistic behavior. The sharecropping salary contract transfers the part of the principal’s remaining rights to encourage the agent’s efforts and reduce the cost of supervision.更多还原