【摘要】 本文基于2006—2014年中国A股上市公司的数据,考察了地方官员晋升压力对公司研发的影响,研究结果表明,地方官员晋升压力抑制了公司研发投入。进一步检验发现,官员任职预期的延长可以弱化晋升压力对公司研发的抑制效应,且任职预期的这种调节作用在市场化程度较低的区域中表现更加明显。最后,我们还考察了官员晋升压力抑制公司研发的作用机制,发现官员晋升压力会通过短期投资激励机制、寻租诱导机制、市场竞争抑制机制等削弱公司研发投入。本文不仅从微观角度揭示了官员晋升压力影响经济增长质量的作用路径,而且也对改善政府治理、促进经济转型具有重要启示。更多还原

【Abstract】 Based on the data of China’s A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2014,this paper analyzes the impact of politicians’ promotion pressure on the company’s research and development. The research results show that politicians’ promotion pressure has inhibited the company’s R&D investment. In addition,we also discussed the regulatory role of the official’s job expectations,and found that the extension of the official’s job expectations can weaken the suppression effect of the promotion pressure on the company’s research and development,and the adjustment effect of the job expectation is more obvious in the less market-oriented regions. In the extended analysis,we further examined the role of politicians’ promotion pressure in suppressing the company’s research and development,and found that the promotion pressure of officials will weaken the R&D investment of enterprises through short-term investment incentive mechanism,rent-seeking induction mechanism,and market competition inhibition mechanism. This paper not only analyzes the role of politicians’ promotion pressures on the quality of economic growth,but also has important implications for improving political governance and promoting economic transformation.更多还原