【摘要】 从近年的实证研究看,我国科技金融结合效率不尽人意。从信息经济学角度分析这种低效率产生的机制。在科技金融合约发生之前,对研发项目的不对称信息造成逆向选择,使得优质项目退出市场。在科技金融合约签订之后,对研发企业努力程度的不对称信息将产生道德风险,将使得其努力程度偏离社会最优水平。最后从市场和政府两个角度出发,给出若干改进建议,以期提高我国科技金融结合效率。更多还原

【Abstract】 From the recent empirical research,China’s combining efficiency of science & technology and finance is low.Analyze the mechanism of this inefficiency from the perspective of information economics.Prior to the occurrence of the financial contract,the asymmetric information of the R&D project was adversely selected,and the good project was withdrawn from the market.After the signing of the financial contract,the asymmetric information on the degree of effort of the R&D enterprise will generate moral hazard,which will make its efforts deviate from the social optimal level.Finally,from the perspective of the market and the government,some suggestions for improvement are given to improve the efficiency of China’s science and technology finance.更多还原