【摘要】 文章对管理层权力、内部控制与高管薪酬业绩敏感性关系以及内部控制对管理层权力与高管薪酬业绩敏感性关系的影响进行实证研究。以2010-2016年我国沪深两市A股上市公司为样本的研究发现:管理层权力与高管薪酬业绩敏感性显著负相关,即管理层权力越大,高管薪酬与公司业绩脱钩越严重;公司内部控制越有效,高管薪酬业绩敏感性越高;有效的内部控制能够抑制管理层权力对高管薪酬业绩敏感性的负面影响。结果说明,管理层权力过大会降低高管薪酬契约的激励作用,而良好的内部控制能够提高高管薪酬契约的有效性,降低管理层权力对高管薪酬契约的负面影响。研究结果对完善公司薪酬制度和内部控制有一定参考价值。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper makes an empirical study on the relationship between management power,internal control and executive compensation performance sensitivity,as well as the influence of internal control on the relationship between management power and executive compensation performance sensitivity.Based on the study of a-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2010 to 2016,it is found that management power is significantly negatively correlated with the sensitivity of executive compensation performance,That is,the greater the power of the management,the more serious the decoupling between executive compensation and corporate performance;The more effective the company’s internal control,the higher the sensitivity of executive compensation performance;Effective internal control can restrain the negative influence of management power on executive compensation performance sensitivity.The results show that the excessive power of management reduces the incentive effect of executive compensation contracts,while good internal control can improve the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts and reduce the negative impact of management power on executive compensation contracts.The results have certain reference value to improve the company compensation system and internal control.更多还原