【摘要】 为实现创新型国家发展战略,适应金融市场的新变化,推动新经济发展,中国允许双重股权架构公司在科创板上市。在双重股权结构公司中存在管理层固化与内部人控制损害外部投资者利益的问题,因而协调创始股东与外部投资者利益关系,化解控制股东与中小股东矛盾,维护中小投资者合法权益非常重要。相较于其他规则,"日落条款"既能够形成合理激励机制,又能够有效约束创始股东或公司实际控制人,限制其不良行为,并在此基础上构建适当的控制权移转机制。为充分发挥"日落条款"的功能,中国应当修改现有规则,确立"日落条款"惩罚性条款地位,明确股东资格,删除"控制权变更"事项,增加诚信义务"日落条款",明晰主动稀释与被动稀释,构建"日落条款"审查机制。更多还原

【Abstract】 In order to realize the development strategy of an innovative country,adapt to the new changes in the financial market and promote the development of the new economy,China allows companies with dual equity structure to be listed on the science and technology innovation board.There are some problems in the dual ownership structure company,such as management solidification and insider control,which damages the interests of external investors.Therefore,it is very important to coordinate the interest relationship between founding shareholders and external investors,resolve the contradiction between controlling shareholders and small and medium-sized shareholders,and safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of small and medium-sized investors.Compared with other rules,"sunset clause", on the one hand, not only can form a reasonable incentive mechanism,but also can effectively restrain the founder shareholders or the actual controller of the company to limit their bad behavior,and on this basis,it constructs an appropriate control transfer mechanism.In order to give full play to the function of sunset clause,China should revise the existing rules,establish the status of punitive clause,clarify the shareholder qualification,delete the "change of control",add the sunset clause of good faith obligation,clarify active dilution and passive dilution,and construct the "sunset" review mechanism.更多还原