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知识产权私有化与不可诉研发补贴规则——基于美国《拜杜法案》补贴争端的思考

Privatization of Intellectual Property Rights and Non-Actionable Research and Development Subsidy Rules——Subsidy Disputes Involving the Bayh-Dole Act

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【作者】 李仲平

【Author】 Li Zhongping;

【机构】 广东金融学院法学院

【摘要】 中国参考美国《拜杜法案》的相关规定,将政府资助项目下的知识产权授予私人研发实体。然而,美国这一知识产权私有化规则与实践已被世界贸易组织争端解决机构认定为可诉性研发补贴。知识产权私有化与可诉性研发补贴之间的耦合,使得恢复并扩大不可诉研发补贴规则具有一定的必要性、正当性和可行性。基于私人研发实体在创新能力、市场规模和营利与否等方面存在的客观差异,中国可在对其进行类型化识别的基础上,提出共同但有区别的变革方案。具体而言,将知识产权私有化纳入不可诉研发补贴的范畴;认定高等教育机构、中小企业和非营利性科研机构获得政府资助项目下的知识产权属于不可诉补贴;明确大企业仅在采用竞争性招投标程序获得政府资助项目下的知识产权时,其获得知识产权才可被视为不可诉补贴。

【Abstract】 China grants intellectual property rights under government-funded projects to private R&D entities in reference to the US Bayh-Dole Act.However,the relevant rules and practices of the Bayh-Dole Act had been recognized as actionable subsidies by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.The coupling between the privatization of intellectual property rights and the actionable R&D subsidies makes it necessary,justified and feasible to resume the non-actionable subsidy rules of R&D.Based on the actual differences of innovation ability,market size and profitability among private R&D entities,common but differentiated exemptions should be implemented on the basis of typological recognition.In particular,the privatization of intellectual property rights is included in non-actionable research and development subsidies;the acquisition of intellectual property rights undergovernment-funded projects by higher education institutions,small and medium-sized enterprises and non-profit R&D organizations usually constitutes non-actionable subsidies;the intellectual property rights acquired by large enterprises can be regarded as nonactionable subsidies only if they engage in competitive bidding procedures undergovernmentfunded projects.

【基金】 国家社会科学基金资助一般项目“‘逆全球化’风潮下国际贸易法治的困境、出路及中国的选择研究”(项目编号:18BFX207);广东省教育厅创新强校工程特色创新类项目(人文社科)“‘网络强国’战略下广东省网络产业补贴政策变革之深化研究”(项目编号:2017WTSCX084)的阶段性研究成果
  • 【文献出处】 国际经济评论 ,International Economic Review , 编辑部邮箱 ,2020年04期
  • 【分类号】D913
  • 【被引频次】2
  • 【下载频次】508
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