【摘要】 利用沪深上市公司2010～2017年的数据,本文分别从股权激励中介的角度和融资约束调节的角度深入考察了管理者过度自信对企业创新投资的作用路径。研究发现:控制企业融资约束后,企业创新投资仍然与管理者过度自信显著正相关,但融资约束在管理者过度自信与企业创新投资的关系中起负向调节作用,企业创新投资与管理者过度自信的正相关关系只表现在融资约束程度较低的组中,当企业融资约束程度较高时,企业创新投资反而与管理者过度自信呈负相关关系;股权激励在高管过度自信与企业创新投资的关系中起部分中介作用。本文对深入理解管理者过度自信对企业技术创新的影响及其作用机理提供了新的经验证据,也为发展激励企业技术创新的机制提供了新的重要视角。更多还原

【Abstract】 Based on the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen listed companies from 2010 to 2017,we examine the role of Financial constraints and equity incentives in the relationship between managerial overconfidence and corporate innovation investment.This study finds that after controlling corporate financial constraints,corporate innovation investment is still significantly and positively related to managerial overconfidence,but financial constraints play a negative role in regulating the relationship between ma-nagerial overconfidence and corporate innovation investment.The positive correlation of managerial overconfidence is only reflected in the group with low-financial constraints.When the degree of financial constraints is high,the innovation investment is negatively correlated with managerial overconfidence;equity incentives play a partial intermediary role in the relationship between executive overconfidence and corporate innovation investment.This paper provides new empirical evidence for understanding the influence of managerial overconfidence on corporate technology innovation and its mechanism,also provides a new important perspective for the development of incentives for technological innovation.更多还原