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零售商主导的农产品供应链公平关切研究

Fairness Concerns in Retailer-Dominated Agri-Food Supply Chain

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【作者】 陈军; 王楠; 邱智慧;

【Author】 CHEN Jun;WANG Nan;QIU Zhihui;School of Economics and Management, Chongqing Jiaotong University;School of Economics and Management, University of Electronic Science and Technology;

【机构】 重庆交通大学经济与管理学院; 电子科技大学经济与管理学院;

【摘要】 强势零售商压低收购价会损害农户利益。对此,就弱势农户自利公平关切和Nash讨价还价公平关切两种情形,采用主从博弈方法研究了农户公平关切对农产品供应链运营效率的影响。结论表明,农户自利公平关切下的收购价最高,Nash讨价还价公平关切下的保鲜努力水平最高。无论农户是何种公平关切,保鲜努力成本分担契约都不能实现供应链协调。如果农户独自承担保鲜努力成本,只有Nash讨价还价公平关切能改善供应链系统利润。

【Abstract】 The farmers’ interests are hurt when the powerful retailers offer a depressed price. To solve this problem,considering weak farmers’ self-interest fairness concerns and Nash bargaining fairness concerns, the effect of the farmer’s fairness concerns on operation efficiency of agri-food supply chain is studied using Stackelberg game theory. The conclusions indicate that the purchase price under self-interest fairness concerns is highest, and the preservation effort level under Nash bargaining fairness concerns is highest. Whatever fairness concerns the farmer has, the freshness-preservation effort cost sharing contract cannot coordinate supply chain. If the farmer alone bears the freshness-preservation effort cost,Pareto improvement for supply chain system’s profit can be implemented just under farmers’ Nash bargaining fairness concerns.

【基金】 国家社会科学基金资助项目(15ZDB169);重庆市教委科学技术研究资助项目(KJQN201800715);重庆市教委人文社会科学研究资助项目(19SKGH061);重庆市基础科学与前沿技术研究专项资助项目(cstc2016jcyjA0528);智能物流网络重庆市重点实验室开放基金资助项目(KLILN2018003)
  • 【文献出处】 工业工程 ,Industrial Engineering Journal , 编辑部邮箱 ,2020年03期
  • 【分类号】F224;F326.6;F274
  • 【被引频次】2
  • 【下载频次】336
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