【摘要】 塞尔等人认为,符号的语义派生于使用者的赋予和解释,而非内在于事物本身,没有任何对象凭借自身就是符号;这一批评带来了人工智能哲学的"符号接地问题"。计算主义认为外显符号的语义派生性并不意味着一切符号都是语义外在的。那么,非派生、固有语义的符号或者说内在表征何以可能?通过分析皮尔士等人的表征元理论可以发现,表征本质上呈现为目的论的多元功能系统。我们尝试藉以表征系统的多元结构对内在表征与外在表征的机制给以分析,得出内在表征在机制上依赖于自组织的内在目的,而外在表征则依赖于外在目的;人工智能若要将内在表征内置其中,需建构出基于内在目的性的自组织计算系统。更多还原

【Abstract】 Searle and some others believe that symbols’ meanings are derived from user’s assigning and interpretation, but not intrinsic to itself, and no object is a symbol by virtue of its physics. This criticism has brought about the "symbol grounding problem" in the philosophy of artificial intelligence. Computationalism believe that explicit symbols’ semantic contents are derived does not mean all the other kinds of symbols are also extrinsic. So, how is it possible that non-derivative, intrinsic representations are possible? By analyzing Peirce and some others’ meta-theories of representation, we can find representation is essentially a multifunctional system of teleology. We try to analyze the mechanisms and forms of intrinsic representation and extrinsic representation by means of the structure of the system, benefit from which it can be drawn that intrinsic representations depend on self-organization, and extrinsic representations depend on the extrinsic purpose. It is necessary for intrinsic representational AI to construct a self-organizing computing system with intrinsic purpose.更多还原