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政策性负担、八项规定与国企高管隐性腐败治理

Policy Burden,Eight-Point Regulation and Governance of Senior Executives’ Implicit Corruption in SOEs

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【作者】 赵纯祥杨怏何威风

【Author】 ZHAO Chunxiang;YANG Yang;HE Weifeng;School of Accounting,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law;School of Foreign Languages,South-Central University For Nationalities;

【通讯作者】 杨怏;

【机构】 中南财经政法大学会计学院中南民族大学外国语学院

【摘要】 本文利用2010~2016年我国A股国有控股上市公司数据,通过OLS方法研究了国有企业政策性负担与管理者隐性腐败之间的关系,以及八项规定对二者关系的影响,研究发现:国企政策性负担与管理者隐性腐败显著正相关,八项规定削弱了国企政策性负担与高管隐性腐败之间的正向关系。在进行内生性控制和稳健性检验后,该研究结论依然成立。进一步分析发现,国企高管政治晋升显著降低了国企政策性负担对高管隐性腐败的影响程度。

【Abstract】 This paper studies the relationship between the policy burden of State-owned Enterprises(SOEs)and senior executives’ implicit corruption,and the influence of the Eight-point Regulation on the preceding relationship by means of OLS.Our study is based on a sample of A-share listed SOEs covering the period from 2010 to 2016.We find that SOEs’ policy burden is significantly and positively related to senior executives’ implicit corruption.Moreover,the positive correlation has been weakened after the implementation of the Eight-point regulation.The aforementioned conclusions are still proven valid after applying instrumental variables to control endogeneity and running a series of robustness tests.The further analysis discovers that the senior executives’ expectation of political promotion has significantly lessened the influence of SOEs’ policy burden on senior executives’ implicit corruption.

【基金】 教育部人文社会科学项目“后薪酬管制时代国企管理者隐性激励问题研究”(15YJC630184);湖北省技术创新专项软科学研究项目“湖北省国有企业创新导向激励问题研究”(2018ADC027)
  • 【文献出处】 中南财经政法大学学报 ,Journal of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law , 编辑部邮箱 ,2019年01期
  • 【分类号】D262.6;F275;F272.91
  • 【被引频次】28
  • 【下载频次】985
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