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虚拟社区知识共享的“囚徒困境”博弈分析——基于完全信息静态与重复博弈

Analysis of “Prisoner’s Dilemma” Game in Virtual Community Knowledge Sharing: Based on Complete Information Static and Repeated Game

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【作者】 李钢卢艳强

【Author】 Li Gang;Lu Yanqiang;School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications;

【机构】 北京邮电大学经济管理学院

【摘要】 虚拟社区参与者在知识共享过程中存在囚徒困境问题,然而采取不同的激励方式无法提高实现参与方的合作共赢的可能性,也未能满足知识获取者的需要。文章从囚徒困境的博弈关系出发,引入知识付费解释变量,运用完全信息静态与重复博弈方法建立模型并进行分析,发现参与双方合作选择"提供知识、付费"是最优策略,有利于降低虚拟社区知识共享的囚徒困境发生,同时有益于提供高知识内容质量以及持续满足知识需求者。

【Abstract】 Virtual community participants continue to have "Prisoner’s Dilemma" issues in the process of knowledge sharing. However, adopting different incentive methods cannot improve the cooperation and win-win of the participants, nor can they meet the needs of the knowledge acquirers. From the game relationship of prisoner’s dilemma, introduce the knowledge payment explanatory variables, use the complete information static and repeat game method to establish the model and analysis. The study found that participating in cooperative selection(providing knowledge, payment) is the best strategy, which helps to reduce the prisoner’s dilemma of knowledge sharing in the virtual community, and is beneficial to providing high quality of knowledge content in order to meet the demand of knowledge continuously.

【关键词】 虚拟社区知识共享知识付费博弈
【Key words】 Virtual communityKnowledge sharingKnowledge paymentGame
【基金】 国家社会科学基金项目“网络匿名行为与网络社会治理研究”(项目编号:15CSH017)研究成果之一
  • 【分类号】G253
  • 【被引频次】15
  • 【下载频次】2426
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