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激励、监督与经销商依从:依赖结构的调节作用

Incentives, Monitoring and Dealers’ Compliance: the Moderating Effects of Dependence Structure

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【作者】 张闯马田园

【Author】 ZHANG Chuang;MA Tian-yuan;School of Business Administration, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics;

【机构】 东北财经大学工商管理学院

【摘要】 文章以代理理论为基础,实证分析激励和监督对经销商依从的影响及依赖结构的调节作用。研究发现:激励会促进经销商依从,而监督则会抑制经销商依从;相互依赖强度会削弱监督对经销商依从的负向影响,但对激励与经销商依从间的关系没有显著影响;经销商相对依赖会增强激励对经销商依从的正向影响,但对监督与经销商依从间的关系没有显著影响。文章最后对研究发现进行讨论,并提出管理建议和未来研究的方向。

【Abstract】 Based on the agency theory, the paper empirically analyzes the effects of incentives and monitoring on the dealers compliance as well as the moderating effects of the dependence structure. The results show that: incentives have a positive effect on the dealers’ compliance, while monitoring inhibits it; inter-dependence weakens the negative effects of monitoring on the dealers’ compliance, but has no significant impact on the relationship between incentives and dealers’ compliance; dealers’ inter-dependence increases the positive effects of incentives on compliance, but has no significant impact on the relationship between monitoring and dealers’ compliance. Finally, the paper provides some suggestions for channel management and possible future research.

【关键词】 激励监督依从依赖结构
【Key words】 incentivesmonitoringcompliancedependence structure
【基金】 国家社会科学基金重大项目“新时代流通服务业高质量发展的路径选择与政策体系构建”(18ZDA058)
  • 【文献出处】 商业经济与管理 ,Journal of Business Economics , 编辑部邮箱 ,2019年12期
  • 【分类号】F274
  • 【被引频次】11
  • 【下载频次】528
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