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上市公司自愿信息披露与高管薪酬绩效敏感度
Voluntary Disclosure and Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity
【摘要】 本文考察了自愿信息披露程度对高管薪酬绩效敏感度的影响。我们发现,自愿信息披露本身对高管薪酬无显著影响,但对高管薪酬绩效敏感度的影响显著为正。此外,在董事会有女性董事或者不存在两权分离的情况下,自愿信息披露对高管薪酬绩效敏感度的影响显著为正。这说明公司治理较好的董事会可以更好的利用自愿披露的信息对高管进行评价,从而改善对高管的激励。
【Abstract】 We examine whether voluntary disclosure on details of operating cash flows improves the effectiveness of executive cash compensation contract.Using Chinese listed firms during 2002-2015,we find that more disclosure is associated with higher sensitivity of executive compensation to the accounting performance.This effect,however,is more dominant in firms with female directors on board of directors or firms without seperation of control rights and cash flow rights.
【关键词】 自愿信息披露;
薪酬绩效敏感度;
女性董事;
两权分离程度;
【Key words】 Voluntary Disclosure; Pay-for-performance Sensitivity; Female Directors; Separation of Control Rights and Cash Flow Rights;
【Key words】 Voluntary Disclosure; Pay-for-performance Sensitivity; Female Directors; Separation of Control Rights and Cash Flow Rights;
【基金】 国家自然科学基金青年基金项目“代理成本、自愿性披露影响因素及自愿披露后果研究”(71302015);第62批中国博士后科学基金(2017M620089)的阶段性成果
- 【文献出处】 会计研究 ,Accounting Research , 编辑部邮箱 ,2019年05期
- 【分类号】F272.92;F832.51;F271;F275
- 【被引频次】42
- 【下载频次】5574