【摘要】 文章采用2003—2014年江西省11个地级市财政教育支出和地级层面官员的面板数据,通过构建计量模型,实证分析了省党代会周期与地方政府财政教育支出之间的内在关系。结果表明,省党代会召开的前一年和当年,地级市财政教育支出显著低于其他年份,分别减少了约5.1%和11%;而省党代会召开后一年,地级市财政教育支出虽继续减少,但下降幅度很小且并不显著。地方政府财政教育支出呈现出明显的政治周期性特征。这个结果在控制了地方官员特征等变量后仍具有很强的稳健性。这些经验证据也显示了地方官员的政治晋升激励虽然会促进地区经济增长,但也可能对地方政府财政教育支出产生负面影响。更多还原

【Abstract】 Based on panel data from fiscal expenditure on education and officials of eleven prefecture-level cities in Jiangxi province from 2003 to 2014, the empirical analysis is made in the paper on intrinsic relations between provincial party congress cycle and local government fiscal expenditure on education by constructing econometric model. The results demonstrates, in previous one year following by provincial party congress and in the same year of it, prefecture-level fiscal expenditure on education is significantly lower than other years, decreased by about 5.1% and 11% respectively. However, a year after provincial party congress, although prefecture-level fiscal expenditure on education continues declining, it is small and insignificant. Local government fiscal expenditure on education presents the characteristics of obvious political cycle. This result still possesses strong robustness in control of variables such as local officials’ features. These empirical evidences also show that while the political promotion incentive of local officials may induce regional economic growth, it also generates negative impacts on local government financial expenditure on education.更多还原