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上市公司董事会治理机制、CEO权力与业绩波动性的实证研究

Empirical Research on Board Governance, CEO Power and Performance Volatility of Listed Companies

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【作者】 刘肖余萍陈海燕

【Author】 LIU Xiao;YU Ping;CHEN Hai-yan;Fuyang Normal University;

【机构】 阜阳师范学院

【摘要】 以2013-2017年沪深两市A股上市公司为研究样本,实证研究CEO权力、董事会治理结构、公司业绩波动性三者之间的关系。研究发现:上市公司CEO权力与业绩波动性呈显著负相关;董事会规模和董事会独立性对企业绩效波动性的影响不明显,董事会持股比例与企业绩效波动性呈显著负相关,董事会会议次数虽然与企业绩效波动性呈负相关,但与纵向绩效波动性相关性不显著;董事会规模、董事会会议次数均能够有效调节CEO权力与公司横向业绩波动性之间的关系,但不能够有效调节CEO权力强度与公司纵向业绩波动性之间的关系,董事会独立性、董事会持股则对二者之间的关系未能起到调节作用。最后,对我国上市公司在改善CEO权力配置、优化董事会治理结构方面给出相应建议。

【Abstract】 Taking the 2013-2017 Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share listed companies as research sample, empirical research on the relationship between CEO power, board governance structure and company performance volatility is put forward. It is found that CEO power of listed companies is significantly negatively correlated with the performance volatility. Second, the impact of board size and board independence on corporate performance volatility is not obvious, the shareholding ratio of the board of directors is significantly negatively correlated with the volatility of corporate performance. Although the number of board meetings is negatively correlated with corporate performance volatility, it is not significantly related to vertical performance volatility. Third, the size of the board of directors and the number of board meetings can effectively adjust the relationship between CEO power and the company’s horizontal performance volatility. However, it cannot effectively adjust the relationship between the strength of CEO power and the volatility of the company’s vertical performance. The independence of the board of directors and the holding of the board of directors have failed to regulate the relationship between the two. Finally,based on the conclusions, the corresponding suggestions of Chinese listed companies in improving the allocation of CEO power and optimizing the governance structure of the board of directors are put forward.

【基金】 安徽省教育厅重点项目“控制权、高管薪酬激励与资本结构调整”(sk2018A0289)
  • 【文献出处】 廊坊师范学院学报(自然科学版) ,Journal of Langfang Normal University(Natural Science Edition) , 编辑部邮箱 ,2019年03期
  • 【分类号】F271;F272.91;F275;F224
  • 【被引频次】3
  • 【下载频次】609
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