【摘要】 本文以2010年至2016年发生高管腐败的国内A股上市公司为研究对象,基于国家审计结果的经验数据,考察了政府质量和产权性质在国家审计与高管腐败关系中的作用,探析了高管腐败在资本配置效率方面的经济后果。研究结果表明,国家审计治理水平越高,国有上市公司高管腐败被揭发的概率越大;在政府质量较差地区的国有企业中,国家审计在经济公权力领域对高管腐败的治理作用越强;高管腐败的行为增加了股权融资成本,降低了投资效率。从国家审计视角研究上市公司高管腐败的治理机制,为国家审计发现、惩治腐败功能实现以及对显性腐败治理提供了经验证据。更多还原

【Abstract】 sing the sample of A-share listed companies with executive corruption from 2010 to 2016,the paper examines the role of governmental quality and nature of property rights in the relationship between national audit and executive corruption based on the experience data of the national auditing. We also study the economic consequences of executive corruption in the capital allocation efficiency. The results show that the higher level of the national auditing governance,the greater the probability that executive corruption was discovered; in the state-owned enterprises located in region with poor-quality governments,the governance role of state audit is stronger; the behavior and extent of executive corruption increase the equity financing costs and reduce the efficiency of investment simultaneously. Taking perspective of national auditing to study the governance mechanism of executive corruption,we provide empirical evidence for state auditing to find corruption,punish corrupt activities and control overt corruption.更多还原