节点文献
污染物总量减排中的任务类型、治理体制与激励错配
Task Type,Governance System and Incentive Mismatch in Total Pollutant Emission Reduction
【摘要】 借鉴交易费用经济学的分析框架,从资产专用性、交易不确定性和交易频率三个维度,首先对主要污染物总量减排中的各项任务进行分析,分别界定其任务属性与任务类型,在总体上将其区分为"生产型任务"与"监管型任务"。其次,按照交易费用经济学对于交易属性与治理结构的匹配关系的分析,指出将不同属性的减排任务以统一的"指标体制"的激励结构进行组织与动员会在其中部分地产生激励错配的问题。对于"监管型任务"与"指标体制"之间激励错配问题的分析表明,在当前的国家制度建设中,建立一个以形式化和非人格化为显著特征的科层制基础上的"监管型国家"具有紧迫而重要的意义。
【Abstract】 Based on the analytical framework of transaction cost economics,from the three dimensions of assets specificity,transaction uncertainty and transaction frequency,the paper firstly analyzes the tasks in total pollutant emission reduction of major pollutants and define their task attribute and task type respectively,which is generally divided into"production task"and"regulatory task". Secondly,according to the discriminating alignment of transaction attribute and governance structures,it argues that to put all kinds of different tasks into a"target-based system"without discrimination will lead to incentive mismatch in some of them. The analysis of the incentive mismatch between the "regulatory tasks"and the governance structure of"target-based system"intends to indicate that a"regulatory state"based on Weberian public bureaucracy is of urgence and significance in the current national system construction,which is characterized by its formal rationality and impersonal relationship.
【Key words】 pollution reduction; official incentives; governance structure; selective policy implementation;
- 【文献出处】 华侨大学学报(哲学社会科学版) ,Journal of Huaqiao University(Philosophy & Social Sciences) , 编辑部邮箱 ,2019年05期
- 【分类号】D630
- 【被引频次】1
- 【下载频次】207