【摘要】 为研究港口危险品安全管理问题,构建由政府、资源提供商和物流服务商三方组成的演化博弈模型,并结合系统动力学仿真分析.结果表明,监管成本、惩罚力度、管理成本和违规收益等因素会对政府、资源提供商和物流服务商博弈行为产生影响.在港口危险品管理过程中,政府是主导者,政府对港口企业采取监管的策略是最理想的状态,港口企业采取策略在很大程度上取决于政府确定的参数大小;资源提供商和物流服务商的策略选择是一致的.政府对物流服务商的处罚力度应该大于物流服务商违规运营时的收益,加大政府处罚力度可以有效降低物流服务商违规运营的比率.更多还原

【Abstract】 In order to study the safety management of dangerous goods in ports, a three-party evolutionary game model composed of government, resource providers and logistics service providers was constructed, and the simulation analysis was carried out by using the system dynamics. Results show that the factors such as supervision cost, punishment intensity, management cost and irregularities income can influence the game behavior of the government, resource providers and logistics service providers. In the process of dangerous goods management in ports, the government is the leader, and the government’s supervision strategy for port enterprises is the most ideal state. The strategy adopted by port enterprises largely depends on the size of the parameters determined by the government. The strategy choices of resource providers and logistics service providers are consistent. The government should punish logistics service providers more severely than the revenue from illegal operation of logistics service providers. Increasing government penalties can effectively reduce the rate of illegal operation of logistics service providers.更多还原