【摘要】 大量研究表明,证券分析师对发达资本市场发挥着有效的治理功能。与此不同,囿于转轨经济和新兴市场的制度特征,分析师治理功能的有效性推论不完全适用于中国资本市场,其治理功能存在中国悖论。分析师关注降低企业与投资者及债权人之间的信息不对称,增加管理者可支配的现金流量,但是,制度制定及其执行效率的缺陷对分析师和管理者个体的"不当"行为后果难以部分或全部内生化,从而造成分析师关注对管理者机会主义行为的监督缺失,进而加剧企业与管理者之间的代理问题即是题中之义。以2003～2014年A股上市公司为研究对象的实证检验表明,分析师关注程度越高,企业与管理者之间的代理成本越大。进一步检验发现,分析师关注缓解的融资约束、增加的企业自由现金流量以及分析师的乐观预测倾向均扩大管理者代理成本,而当前不完善的法律制度无法显著抑制分析师关注对管理者代理成本的负面效应。更多还原

【Abstract】 Many studies have shown that securities analysts play an effective governance function in the developed capital markets. However, the inference of validity of analysts governance function is not entirely applicable to China’s capital market because of the institutional characteristics of the transitional economy and the emerging market, and its governance function has Chinese paradox. Analysts coverage reduces information asymmetry between enterprises and investors and creditors, which increases the cash flow that can be used by the management. But the defects in the system making and the efficiency of its implementation make it difficult for the consequences of the "improper" behavior of an analyst and a managerto be partially or entirely endogenous, thus leading to the lack of supervision by analysts over the opportunism behaviors of managers.The empirical studies of A-shares listed companies in China from 2003 to 2014 finds that the higher the analyst coverage degreeis, the higher the agency cost between the enterprises and managers. Further research also shows that the mitigated financing constraintsand the increased free cash flow as a result of the analyst coverage, and analysts’ optimistic forecasts tendency will enlarge managerial agency costs, but the currently imperfect legal system can not significantly inhibit the negative effects of the analysts coverage on the agency cost.更多还原