【摘要】 针对当前存在的偷排现象,从组织行为视角,利用演化博弈理论,考虑企业排放物部分偷排的非法排污行为,对环境税及相关实施条例下的排污企业、地方政府间的相互作用关系进行了研究并以安徽省排污企业化学需氧量排放为例进行了算例分析。研究表明:(1)环境税及相关实施条例无法完全杜绝安徽省排污企业的非法排污行为,但可以使排污企业、地方政府的演化过程收敛于一个混合的演化稳定策略(0.734 9,0.965 4);(2)企业群体中最终采取合法排污策略的概率和偷排量正相关,小规模偷排行的企业为应为监管重点;(3)偷排量占比存在一个阈值,提升企业环境行为的关键是控制偷排量占比而非提升污染物去除率;在将非法排污企业偷排量占比限制在阈值16.7%内的基础上,提升其污染物去除率才能有效改善安徽省排污企业环境行为。更多还原

【Abstract】 In view of the current phenomenon of stealth discharge,the illegal discharge of pollutant discharge of enterprises is considered,and the interactional relationship between the pollutant discharge enterprises and local governments under the environmental tax and related implementation regulations is studied from the perspective of organizational behavior and using evolutionary game theory. The chemical oxygen demand of the pollutant discharge enterprises in Anhui province is given as analysis of example. The research shows that:(1)the environmental tax and related implementation regulations can not completely eliminate the illegal discharge behavior of enterprises,but can make the evolution process of pollutant discharge enterprises and local governments converged to a mixed evolutionary stable strategy(0.734 9,0.965 4);(2)the probability of final legal discharge strategy is positively correlated with the volume of stealth discharge,and the small volume of stealth discharge should be seriously supervised;(3)the proportion of stealth discharge has a threshold value,which is the key to promote environmental behavior; limiting the proportion of stealth discharge below 16.7% and then promoting the removal rate of pollutants is an important way to improve the environmental behavior of illegal pollutant discharge enterprises.更多还原