【摘要】 中小企业融资难问题是限制其发展的关键问题,保兑仓融资作为供应链金融的典型融资模式,通过制造商、零售商和银行三方合作达到共赢,增强供应链整体竞争力。但是,保兑仓融资模式下的供应链因为双重边际效应在分散决策时不能协调,且制造商承诺回购使零售商倾向于超量订货而又不付出相应的销售努力。本文为保兑仓融资模式下的供应链建立Stackelberg博弈模型,在考虑销售努力的情况下分别研究应用保兑仓融资时集中决策和分散决策下零售商的订货量和努力水平,研究销售奖惩策略下和支持回购的销售奖惩策略下供应链的协调情况,最终发现只有支持回购的销售奖惩策略可以协调应用保兑仓融资的供应链。算例研究进一步验证了研究结论。更多还原

【Abstract】 As a typical method to finance supply chains through cooperation among manufacturers, retailers and banks, confirming warehouse financing(CWF) provides working capital to small and medium enterprises, enhances supply chain competitiveness through win-win solutions and reduces credit risk of banks. However, when decisions are decentralised, CWF cannot coordinate the entire supply chain because of double marginalisation, and manufacturer’s promise to buyback unsold products makes the retailer tend to order much more products than market demand but not to pay enough effort to sell it. Assuming that final consumer demand is influenced by retailers’ sales efforts, we construct a Stackelberg model of supply chain financed via CWF. This paper studies optimal order quantities and sales efforts when decisions are centralised and decentralised and shows that traditional CWF cannot coordinate the supply chain. Two coordinated policies are examined: one that employs sales rebates and penalties and the other that employs sales rebates and penalties with merchandise return privileges. We show that only the latter can coordinate a supply chain financed via CWF. A numerical example illustrates the findings of this study.更多还原