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基于演化博弈理论的绿色施工激励研究

Incentive Research Based on Evolutionary Game Theory for Green Construction

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【作者】 陆秋虹肖伟巍

【Author】 LU Qiu-hong;XIAO Wei-wei;School of Management,Xi’an University of Architecture and Technology;

【通讯作者】 陆秋虹;

【机构】 西安建筑科技大学管理学院

【摘要】 在全面推进生态文明建设的大环境下,绿色施工无疑是建筑业的必然选择.由于绿色施工正外部性引起的市场失灵,必须要有政府的介入来协助其推广.基于演化博弈理论的视角,在一定假设条件的前提下,总结出双方的利益参数,兼顾政府和企业自身的利益和成本,建立了有限理性下的支付函数和复制动态方程,确定政府实施激励政策时的激励度,并利用MATLAB软件进行模拟仿真验证.研究表明,政府在实施激励政策时,除了给评选为"绿色施工示范工程"的施工单位一定的经济奖励外,还要大力推广新技术、材料和设备的研发使用,在此基础上,增加一定的约束条件,如对传统施工企业增加税收也有助于绿色施工的推广.

【Abstract】 In the general background of ecological civilization construction,green construction has become a necessary choice in the construction industry.The government intervention would be essential,due to market failure caused by the positive externality of green construction.Therefore,on the basis of evolutionary game theory,after analyzing the behavior of relevant subjects,the interest parameters of both parties are summarized.Taking into account the interests and costs of the government and enterprises,and establishing the payment function and copy dynamic equation under the limited rationality,to determine the incentive degree of the government when implement the incentive policy,then MATLAB software is used to simulated,and some relevant incentives are offered finally.In addition to award construction enterprise and promote the development,the use of new technologies,materials and equipment,green construction would be promoted with certain constraint condition,such as green taxes.

  • 【文献出处】 湘潭大学自然科学学报 ,Natural Science Journal of Xiangtan University , 编辑部邮箱 ,2018年05期
  • 【分类号】TU74
  • 【被引频次】4
  • 【下载频次】152
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