【摘要】 考虑二氧化碳等温室气体对环境的破坏作用,建立了碳交易政策和碳税政策下政府和生产商间的Stackelberg博弈模型,通过比较两种政策下生产商的最优环保创新水平、社会总产出、社会总碳排放量以及社会福利,探讨了两种碳减排政策的最优问题.研究表明,相比碳税政策,当二氧化碳等温室气体对环境的破坏作用较小时,碳交易政策下生产商的环保创新水平较高,社会总产出和社会总碳排放量较低,社会福利较高;当二氧化碳等温室气体对环境的破坏作用较大时,碳交易政策下生产商的环保创新水平较低,社会总产出和社会总碳排放量较高,社会福利较低.更多还原

【Abstract】 Considering the emissions of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide that damage the environment, this paper establishes Stackelberg models between the government and the manufacturers under the cap-and-trade policy and the carbon taxes policy, and investigates the dominant policies between cap-and-trade and carbon taxes by comparing the manufacturers’ optimal environmental innovation level, total output, total carbon emissions and social welfare under each policy. The results show that when the damage effect of emissions of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide on the environment is low, the environmental innovation of manufacturers is higher, total output and total carbon emissions are lower and social welfare is higher under cap-and-trade policy than those under carbon taxes policy. When the damage effect is strong, the environmental innovation of manufacturers is lower, total output and total carbon emissions are higher and social welfare is lower under cap-and-trade policy than those under carbon taxes policy.更多还原