【摘要】 中国地方官员由上级任命而进入地方官员系列。本文证明,当上级随着任期增加越来越"熟练地创造"职位空缺、越来越难以出台新政策时,晋升下级官员数量、下级官员系列的进入率和晋升为下级官员的晋升率在上级任期内呈倒U型。实证上,本文构建了一个省委书记-晋升地厅级官员数量相匹配的数据库,验证了这些倒U型,且在任期的第三年达到最大值。本文的发现揭示了,尽管法定任期是五年,但任期实际缩短到三年左右将带来下级官员队伍增加。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper investigates how superior leaders appoint their subordinates in China.We advance and empirically establish the hypothesis that variation in the tenure of the superior has an inverted-U shaped effect on the quantity of newly promoted subordinate,the entry rate of subordinate,and the promotion rate of being a newly promoted subordinate,reflecting the trade-off between the beneficial and detrimental effects of tenure of superior on appointment function.While the de-jure5-year tenure may constraint the size of the subordinates,the de-facto 3-year tenure of provincial party secretary has been conducive for expansion in the size of subordinates.更多还原