【摘要】 集体经营性建设用地入市改革是在市场导向下的集体经济组织、用地企业及地方政府的博弈过程,地方政府的博弈策略对不同主体的策略选择及效用具有重要影响。采用博弈论对地方政府的策略及角色定位进行深入研究。结果表明:在集体经营性建设用地流转过程中,交易成本是影响集体经济组织和用地企业进行策略选择的关键因素,且分为正常成本、风险成本一及风险成本二;地方政府实行合谋策略会增加风险成本二,阻碍交易发生并减弱社会总效用。因而,地方政府应积极构建集体建设用地流转交易平台降低风险成本一,从市场参与者向管理者和服务者的角色转变,消除合谋策略降低风险成本二,推进集体经营性建设用地市场化建设,培育和完善城乡统一建设用地市场。更多还原

【Abstract】 The reform of collective management of profitable land is a game process of collective economic organization, land use enterprise, and local government under market guidance, and the local government’s game strategy has an important influence on the strategic choice and effectiveness of different entities. This study uses game theory to analyze the strategy and role of local government. The results show that in the process of collective profitable land transfer, transaction cost is the key factor affecting the strategic choice of collective economic organizations and land use enterprises. Transaction cost can be divided into three categories: normal cost, risk cost one, and risk cost two. Implementation of collusion strategies by local government will increase risk cost two, hinder the transactions, and reduce the total effectiveness of society. Therefore, local governments should actively build a collective land circulation trading platform to reduce risk cost one, change the role of market participants to managers and service providers, eliminate collusion strategies, and reduce risk cost two. Moreover, local governments should promote market-oriented construction on collective profitable land and cultivate a unified urban construction land market更多还原