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契约不完全、剩余权利合理配置与农业产业化组织模式优选
Incomplete Contract,Reasonable Allocation of Surplus Rights and Optimization of Agricultural Industrialization Organization Model
【摘要】 当前我国农业产业化效益不高,一个重要原因就是盲目推广与套用导致的农业产业化组织模式选择不合理。预见成本、缔约成本与证实成本使得农业产业化契约具有显著的不完全性,由此引发的"敲竹杠"会造成专用性资产投资较多一方的投资激励扭曲,从而降低农业产业化经营绩效。不同的农业产业化组织模式对应不同的剩余权利配置,应通过组织模式的恰当选择使得进行较多专用性资产投资的一方拥有更多剩余权利,从而实现剩余权利的合理配置,抑制"敲竹杠",有效增强专用性资产投资激励,提高农业产业化经营绩效。
【Abstract】 At present,the efficiency of China’s agricultural industrialization is not high.An important reason is that the selection of agricultural industrialization mode caused by blind promotion and application is unreasonable.Foreseeing costs,contracting costs and confirming costs make the agricultural industrialization contract have significant incompleteness,and the resulting " knocking" will cause distortions in the investment incentives of the more specialized assets investment,thus reducing the agricultural industrialization performance.Different agricultural industrialization organizations correspond to different residual rights allocations.The appropriate choice of organizational model should enable more parties to invest more specific assets to have more residual rights,thus realizing the rational allocation of residual rights and restraining " knocking".Effectively enhance the incentives for investment in specific assets and improve the performance of agricultural industrialization operations.
【Key words】 incomplete contract; allocation of residual rights; investment in specific assets; organizational model of agricultural industrialization;
- 【文献出处】 前沿 ,Forward Position , 编辑部邮箱 ,2018年06期
- 【分类号】F323
- 【被引频次】2
- 【下载频次】156