【摘要】 基于2014年中国法院公布的受贿罪一审刑事判决书,本文首次探讨了受贿主体的职务级别、法律制度设计和腐败惩罚之间的关系。我们发现"高官轻惩"只是外在表象,是刑法修改前"刚性受贿金额决定量刑"这一惩罚规则掩盖下的假象。在考虑法律设计特征、控制腐败惩罚的边际递减效应后,能够得出高级别贪官腐败惩罚更重的结论。进一步的分析表明,导致腐败惩罚扭曲表象的原因主要是刑法调整滞后所致,并不是"刑不上大夫"的现代复活。更多还原

【Abstract】 Based on the first-instance bribery judgment published by the Chinese court in 2014,we conduct the first empirical study of the relationships among the ranks of corrupt officials,legal institutional design and corruption punishment. There is a distorted representation that the punishment for high-ranking corrupt officials is lighter,belying the fact that the sentencing range depends on the amount of bribes(beforethe criminal law amendment).However,by considering the legal design and controlling the diminishing marginal effect of the corruption punishment,we can find that punishment for the higherranking corrupt officials is severer.The representation of punishment distortion is mainly caused by the lag in the adjustment of criminal law.更多还原