【摘要】 违章处罚是我国煤矿普遍采用的一种负向激励方式。为了增加处罚的威慑,煤矿更多采用较高处罚金额的手段,而忽略了惩罚概率这一同样重要因素。本文通过构建一个不确定惩罚下的矿工期望收益模型,分析了矿工安全投入的影响因素和具有威慑力的最优处罚。利用Logistic模型实证了"高额"和"高频"两种模式对矿工实际的威慑效果。进一步,深入煤矿内部安全监管制度从源头寻找效果不同的原因。本文的结论是:违章处罚理论上会增加矿工生产过程中的安全投入;处罚的力度和频度共同影响着处罚的威慑力;现实中,"高频处罚"对于矿工的威慑力显著,而"高额处罚"并没有显著改变矿工行为;煤矿设置的最低查处任务,未能有效激励安监员,退变成为其努力目标,导致矿工违章被抓概率极低,大幅降低矿工的违章成本,是"高额处罚"效果欠佳的重要原因。更多还原

【Abstract】 For the illegal behavior in the production process,through internal supervision and corresponding punishment is the main negative incentive means widely used in coalmine in our country. The safety supervisors inside the coalmine complete the investigation and punishment. Corresponding punishment be carried out according to the seriousness of the act.In order to increase the deterrent of punishment,coalmine more often use the means of higher penalty amount,while ignoring the equally important factor of punishment probability.Through constructing a model of miners ’ expected income under uncertain punishment,this paper analyzes the influencing factors of miners ’ safety investment and the optimal punishment with deterrent force. Because our country coalmine generally adopts the piecework wage system,to the coal output incentive is bigger. Under the other condition invariable situation,the worker’s optimal reflection is increases the labor input. In the case of constant total labor input,the safety input is reduced,which is not conducive to the production safety of coalmine. Especially in the period of rising coal prices,coalmines are more inclined to formulate policies to stimulate production. Other conditions unchanged,the greater the punishment for violation of regulations,the safety of miners will increase. When an accident occurs,if the coalmine can be clear about responsibility,it will encourage miners to invest more in safety. Further,through in-depth analysis of coal mine safety management documents and violations of investigation and punishment account,this paper discusses the background of the two supervision models,and points out the possible problems in the process of supervision. Finally,this paper uses logistic model to demonstrate the deterrent effect of "high punishment"and "high frequency punishment"on miners.The main conclusions of this paper are as follows. First of all,the more incentive the coalmine adopts piece-rate system for coal production,the less conducive to the safety of coalmine production. In order to avoid coalmine safety accidents,first of all,we should learn from the foreign coal mine resolutely put an end to overproduction system. Secondly,the optimal penalty model shows that the optimal penalty amount of unsafe behavior is inversely proportional to the probability of being caught. The higher the output income of the miners,the heavier the fine may be in case of violation of regulations in production. When a miner has been punished for a serious accident,the penalty for violating the regulations can be reduced.But if the violation causes the accident to be lighter or the accident responsibility is lighter,in order to let the punishment achieve the deterrent force,the coal mine should increase to the miner’s violation punishment dynamics. The local wage level affects the participation constraints of miners,and plays a certain role in restricting the optimal penalty amount. If the high punishment is accompanied by a sharp drop in the probability of workers being caught violating regulations,it is very difficult to achieve the deterrent effect of high punishment; and high frequency punishment can be implemented with a very low amount of punishment through the concept of "breaking the rules and regulations must be caught". Third,the high punishment is likely to cause injustice,the miners were not caught because of their own understanding of the violations,but more that their bad luck,or safety wardens deliberately looking for their own trouble,the effect of education is not good.Therefore,high punishment is also a challenge for safety inspectors,increasing the difficulty of the work. Finally,the coal mine to each safety supervisor set the task of investigation and punishment not only failed to mobilize the enthusiasm of the safety supervisor,the efforts to reverse the transformation into a safety supervisor goal. At the same time,the monitoring index has also become the expected loss index of coal miners caught in violation of the rules and regulations. Therefore,coal mines should give up such indicators with greater negative effects and adopt the methods of reducing the amount of punishment,increasing the frequency of inspection,and setting up positive incentives,so as to foster a harmonious regulatory environment. By which,a"safety atmosphere"be created to enhance the safety level of coalmines in China to a higher level.更多还原