【摘要】 互联网金融发展日新月异,电商企业与商业银行合作共建在线供应链金融是大势所趋。研究构建了电商企业与银行演化博弈模型,进一步引入违约惩罚契约,对比了无、低、高违约惩罚契约下演化博弈的稳定结果。研究表明:无惩罚时电商企业与银行最终必然演化稳定于双方均竞争策略,合作关系无法维系;违约惩罚契约确实会对合作维持起到保障作用,但低惩罚契约下银电双方仍更多情况会选择竞争策略,且稳定情况受收益函数、博弈初始策略选择概率的双重影响;高惩罚契约下,银电选择合作策略的概率明显高于前两者,当合作策略超额收益均优于竞争策略时,双方最终稳定于合作策略。研究结论为促进电商企业与银行合力共建在线供应链金融业务以实现双赢的实践提供参考。更多还原

【Abstract】 The development of internet finance is changing with each passing day,online supply-chain finance built by cooperated e-commerce and bank is the general trend.Here it builds developing model of ecommerce and bank with penalty of breach of contract and compares the result under no,low and high penalty.The research result is as follows:first,without penalty,e-commerce companies and bank have same competitive strategy,so the cooperation can′t stand long.Penalty of breach of contract indeed can protect cooperation,but under low penalty,both will select competitive strategy in most cases,and stability condition is subject to revenue function,primary strategy selecting probability;under high penalty,the probability that bank e-commerce select cooperation is evidently higher than the above.When an excess earnings of cooperation strategy is higher than competitive strategy,both will get stable cooperation.It is concluded that promoting cooperation between e-commerce company and bank to build online supply chain finance for win-win.更多还原