【摘要】 真值函项的蕴含面临着所谓的"蕴含悖论",它也是"乌鸦悖论"、"经验意义标准"难题、葛第尔问题等一系列认识论难题的逻辑根源。认知蕴含定义了一种非真值函项的蕴含关系。如果"如果p那么q"是一种认知蕴含,那么这个蕴含式是真的,当且仅当在p为真的条件下,q的概率是1。因此,认知蕴含表达一种特殊的条件概念。相应地,部分认知蕴含可以基于概率论建立起来。引入认知蕴含,可以消解上述认识论难题,普通认知条件句和虚拟条件句(反事实条件句)也能以同样的方式来处理,而不必求助于"可能世界"。更多还原

【Abstract】 Truth-functional implication gives rise to the paradox of implication which is the logical root of various philosophical puzzles like "raven paradox"concerning confirmation,the lack of strictness in formulating a criterion of empirical meaningfulness,and Gettierized doubt about tripartite definition of knowledge in epistemology. In present article,I introduce a non-truth-functional implication—cognitive implication. Suppose that "if p then q"signifies a cognitive implication,the cognitive conditional is true if and only if the conditional probability of q is unit given p. It suggests that cognitive implication captures a specified conception of conditionality. The conception of cognitive implication can be extended to cognitively partial implication in terms of probability theory. Having introduced cognitive implication,above "puzzles"can have a easy solution,and counterfactuals can be treated in the same way as cognitive conditionals in general where the non-natural concept of "possible world"finds no place.更多还原