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旅游景区欺诈行为的博弈分析
Game Analysis on the Fraud of Tourist Scenic Areas
【摘要】 从商户与商户之间的博弈关系以及商户与游客之间的博弈关系两方面进行研究,并在后者博弈关系中,将根据商户与游客之间的交易频次不同即单次博弈、无限次博弈以及有限多次博弈三种不同情况进行深入分析。分析表明景区商品之所以卖得奇高甚至假货当道的最主要原因是商户普遍认为游客的购买行为是一次性的,因而作为一个理性人,商户都会从自身利益最大化的立场出发,选择欺诈经营。根据分析结果,提出了两个有效应对方法:一是让商户认识到欺诈经营导致自身诚信破产的严重性,二是通过官方惩处商户欺诈经营的行为以增加其欺诈经营的成本。
【Abstract】 Nowadays,there is a common phenomenon in the scenic areas that commodity prices are particularly higher than other places and tourists even often buy fakes.Therefore, this paper will take a research to explore the reason for this phenomenon from two aspects of the game relationship between merchants themselves and merchants vs tourists.And in the latter game relationship,we will have a detail analysis about three different situations that are single game relationship,unlimited number of game relationship and limited number of game relationship on the basis of the frequency of transactions between merchants and tourists.Finally, the result of analysis shows that the main reason of this phenomenon is that merchants generally believe the purchase behavior of tourists is an one-time action, and therefore as a rational person, merchant will usually choose fraudulent operation to maximize his or her profit.According to the analysis results, this paper summarizes two coping methods, one is to let merchants to recognize the severity of their fraudulent operation which will lead to the bankruptcy of integrity, and the other is to increase their fraudulent operating costs through the official punishment.
- 【文献出处】 中国林业经济 ,China Forestry Economics , 编辑部邮箱 ,2017年05期
- 【分类号】D924.35;F592
- 【下载频次】165