【摘要】 针对风险中性业主和风险厌恶供应商组成的两级工程供应链,研究重大工程供应商培育的激励机制,包括投资成本分担和采购价格激励两种激励方式.根据工程业主的主导地位,分别建立供应商培育的委托代理模型和Stackelberg博弈模型.研究表明,委托代理模型中最优质量水平更高,供应链的总期望效用更大,采购价格激励和投资成本分担均能促进供应商提升质量水平,且投资成本分担比采购价格激励对质量水平的影响更大,供应商生产成本与质量提升成负相关,供应商风险承受水平与质量提升成正相关,未来市场需求与质量提升成正相关.更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper investigates the incentive mechamsms for supplier development in a construction supply chain that consists of a risk-neutral owner and a risk-averse supplier.Two commonly used incentive methods,including purchase price incentive and cost sharing,are studied.Considering the owner’s dominant position,a principal-agent model and a Stackelberg game model are proposed.It shows that the optimal quality and the total utility of the supply chain in the principal-agent model are higher.Both the purchasing price incentive and cost sharing can promote the supplier to improve the quality level,and the impact of cost sharing on quality improvement is greater.Quality improvement has a negative correlation with the supplier’s production cost,and the supplier’s risk tolerance level and the market demand have positive correlations with quality improvement.更多还原