【摘要】 "政企合谋"行为增加了环境治理的成本,抑制了企业环境技术创新的动力,加剧了地方政府环境治理的"路径依赖"并形成了无效率的"锁定效应",最终降低了全社会福利并延缓了"美丽中国"的建设进程。通过构建一个简单的两层委托代理模型,分析了经济发展新常态中地方政府与企业环境污染规制中企业隐藏自身污染信息的逆向选择以及与地方政府合谋的道德风险等机会主义行为,并研究遏制这种不良后果的实现机制。通过对惩罚、补贴、考核、巡查以及第四方公众的监督等规制工具的综合分析表明,首先,中央政府的惩罚能够有效实现政企合谋的防范,从理论上解释了新环保法中中央政府加大对企业和地方政府惩罚的法律规范条文,并对现实中环保部约谈地方政府行政首脑的行为给予理论支持;其次,对污染治理成本较高行业的企业或者产污量较高的企业需要增大治污补贴,减少对地方政府政绩考核中经济建设的权重比例,加强第四方媒体公众的监督效率以及加强中央政府主动获取信息渠道的建设等,均可防范合谋。更多还原

【Abstract】 "Government-firm collusion" increases the cost of environmental governance, restrains the power of enterprise’s environmental technology innovation, aggravates the "path dependence" of local government environmental governance and results in the inefficient "lock-in effect", which contributes to reduction of the welfare of society, and delaying the "wild China" in the process of building. We build a simple two principal-agent model to analyze the adverse selection of local corporate by hiding self-pollution information and the moral hazard caused by Government-Firm collusion. And we will research a mechanism to prevent such adverse consequences. Through analysis of the related factors such as punishment, subsidy, assessment, check and the fourth party public supervision, the results shows that the punishment can effectively prevent the collusion between government and enterprises. In theory, it explains that the new environment law which increases the legal standard of punishment of the enterprise and local government, and the action of the ministry of environment protection interviews local government administrative leaders. Secondly, the ways of preventing collusion are including more subsidies to the high cost of pollution control business enterprises or the amount of pollution produced higher pollution enterprises, reduction of local government performance appraisal in the weight ratio of economic construction, strengthening the supervision efficiency of the fourth party media and strengthening the construction of information channels with which the central government can take the initiative to obtain information.更多还原