【摘要】 中国区域经济增长的收敛问题一直备受学术界关注,现有研究结果存在很大的分歧:从不存在收敛到俱乐部收敛到有条件收敛。产生分歧的根本原因是忽视了政府治理机制对于各地经济增长水平的影响。从中国"经济分权政治集中"的政府治理机制出发,会产生促进区域经济收敛到相近水平的可能性。以财政分权代表经济分权,官员升迁制度代表政治集中,结合2002 2013年的数据,分两阶段对该治理机制与区域经济收敛的关系进行深入探讨。实证分析结果表明:纳入政府行政体制因素和空间相关性,我国区域经济增长即是条件收敛的。但是经济分权对该收敛过程无显著影响。更多还原

【Abstract】 Whether there is any regional convergence of growth in China has been a major concern of academia.Current literature shows no sign of consensus and the difference is enormous among the results,which ranges from no convergence at all to club convergence and conditional convergence.The fundamental cause of such a difference lies in the fact that the impact of the state governance mechanism on the regional economic growth has been ignored in the research.Following China’s state governance mechanism of"economic decentralization with political centralization",it is possible for regions to converge to a state that their economic situations are reasonably close.Using fiscal decentralization as a proxy for economic decentralization and government official’s promotion mechanism as a proxy for political centralization,with the annual data from 2002-2013,this paper discusses the relationship between the state governance mechanism and the regional economic growth.The empirical results show that if the factors of government administration and spatial correlation are incorporated,the regional growth converges in China,that is,conditional convergence holds.However,economic decentralization has no significant impact on the convergence.更多还原