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带有自愿接种博弈的SIV性传染病模型的建立与分析

Establishment and Analysis of SIV Model of Sexually Transmitted Diease with Voluntary Vaccination Strategy

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【作者】 汤瑞瑞张菊平

【Author】 TANG Rui-rui;ZHANG Ju-ping;School of Science,North University of China;

【机构】 中北大学理学院

【摘要】 为揭示性传染病中个体自愿接种决策与疾病传播和控制之间的关系,将进化博弈论引入到传染病模型中,建立了针对高危人群的带有自愿接种博弈的SIV性传染病模型.结果表明,个体自愿接种的理性决策取决于疾病传播规模及疫苗接种的"成本",这两类信息在疾病蔓延较快时具有相对立的关系.高危人群对于疫苗"成本-效益"地估计变得更精确时,隐藏着较大的疾病爆发风险.对于一般个体,了解大量最新的疫情信息反而不利于对疾病的控制.

【Abstract】 In order to reveal the relationships between individuals’ voluntary decisions on vaccination and spread and control of sexually transmitted diseases,evolutionary game theory was integrated into the epidemic models.An epidemic model with voluntary vaccination at high risk groups was constructed.The results after analyzing models show that individual’s rational decision on voluntary vaccination depends on two kinds of information,the size of disease transmission and the"cost"of vaccination,which lead to the opposite conclusions when the spread of the disease is large.It hides the risk of larger disease outbreaks when the estimation of"cost-benefit"for vaccination is more precise.The most important thing is that knowing a large number of information about the latest outbreaks and vaccination is not conducive to disease control for the general public.

【基金】 国家自然科学基金资助项目(11301491);山西省自然科学基金资助项目(2015011009);山西省自然科学基金面上青年基金资助项目(201601D021015)
  • 【文献出处】 中北大学学报(自然科学版) ,Journal of North University of China(Natural Science Edition) , 编辑部邮箱 ,2017年06期
  • 【分类号】O175
  • 【被引频次】1
  • 【下载频次】152
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