【摘要】 本文基于政治成本假说考察民营企业家的"原罪"嫌疑是否会影响其所控制的企业的会计信息质量。选取2003~2012年间上市时实际控制人为个人或家族的民营企业为样本,本文追溯了样本公司产权的初始形成方式,将其划分为创业型民营企业和国有转制型民营企业。其中,国有转制型民营企业在向私有产权转变过程中可能涉及诸多问题,更容易被公众认为具有"原罪"嫌疑,因此有动机降低信息透明度以减少外界关注所带来的政治成本。实证检验发现,与创业型民营企业相比,国有转制型民营企业的会计盈余信息含量显著较低;并且,这一现象在市场化程度较低的地区更为显著。进一步地,本文还发现,当民营企业家首次登上"胡润百富榜"以及《国有资产法》颁布之后,国有转制型民营企业的会计信息质量显著下降更多。总之,本文的研究表明,民营企业家背负的"原罪"嫌疑会降低其所经营的企业的会计信息质量。更多还原

【Abstract】 From the perspective of political cost hypothesis, this paper investigates whether private entrepreneurs ’" original sin "suspicion can influence their firms ’earnings quality. Based on a sample from private listed firms which are con-trolled by entrepreneurs or their families between 2003 and 2012, we divide the firms into two groups, namely the de novo private firms and the privatized firms, according to their original evolution of property rights. Compared with the de novo private firms, the privatized firms may suffer suspicion of original sin from public due to the opaque transformation process from state-owned property rights to privately-owned property rights. In order to reduce the political costs arising from this suspicion, the privatized firms tend to lower their transparency. Our empirical results show that the informativeness of accounting earnings of privatized firms is significantly lower than that of de novo private firms. And this phenomenon is more pronounced in the provinces with low marketization progress. Furthermore, we find significant decline of earnings quality for privatized firms when the entrepreneurs were showed up on the Hurun Rich List for the first time and when the Enterprise State-owned Assets Law was promulgated. In short, this paper suggeststhat the entrepreneurs ’original sin causes the lower transparency of private firms.更多还原