【摘要】 本文在VMCI模式下,考虑销售努力水平对市场需求的影响,研究批发价决策权由供应商转移至零售商的两级供应链效率改进问题。假定零售商决策批发价和销售努力水平,供应商决策寄售量,建立了零售商主导的Stackelberg博弈模型,证明了集中决策下的最优解和分散决策下的均衡解均存在且唯一,集中决策下的寄售因子大于分散决策下的对应值。随后,引入收入共享与销售努力成本共担契约,论证了系统中寄售因子保持不变、批发价降低,且当契约参数满足一定条件时,可实现帕累托改进,实现供应链的效率改进。最后,分析了契约参数对于系统决策变量及利润的影响。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper studies the efficiency promotion of the wholesale pricing power transferring to the retailer in a two-echelon supply chain under VMCI,while considering sales effort affecting the terminal market demand. Assuming that the wholesale price and sales effort are decided by the retailer who is the leader in this supply chain and the consignment amount is decided by the supplier,the Stackelberg game model is established. It is verified that the optimal solution in centralized decision-making model and the equilibrium solution in decentralized decision-making model are all existed and unique. Also,the result shows the consignment factor is larger in the centralized model than that in the decentralized. Then,the consignment factor is verified invariable and the wholesale price decreases after introducing the revenue and sales effort cost sharing contract. Furthermore,the supply chain can realize the Pareto improvement by which supply chain efficiency is improved when contract parameters satisfy certain conditions. Finally,the impact of contract parameters on system decision variables and profits are analyzed.更多还原