【摘要】 目标价格保险在市场价格过低时能够给予农户一定补偿,但同时也会影响农户种植决策。假设收购商决定收购价,就政府是否推出目标价格保险及其是否共享种植规划信息,建立了两个农户和一个收购商组成的农产品供应链博弈模型。比较5种方案的社会福利和农户单产利润两个指标发现,只有一个政府推出目标价格保险并且后披露规划信息,同时收购商采取歧视定价策略时的社会福利最大;政府不披露规划信息并且收购商采取统一定价策略时的社会福利最小。若都不披露规划信息,两个政府与其中一个政府推出目标价格保险几乎无差异。更多还原

【Abstract】 Target price insurance policy can give farmers a certain compensation when market price is too low, but it also affects farmers’ production decision. Assuming that the buyer decides the purchase price, the game models are constructed in an agri-food supply chain consisting of two farmers and a buyer, considering whether the government launches target price insurance or shares the planning information. Comparing two indexes of social welfare and farmer’s average profit for five schemes, it is observed that one scheme can maximize social welfare when just a government launches target price insurance and disclose planning information later, as well as the buyer takes discriminatory pricing strategy. Another scheme will minimize social welfare when the two governments don’t disclose planning information and the buyer takes uniform pricing strategy. Being such a case, it makes little difference whether one or two governments launch target price insurance.更多还原