【摘要】 20世纪60年代,科学哲学与核心哲学之间早先亲密的关系开始急剧改变,库恩和他的同时代人提出了科学哲学独具匠心的问题,带来了多少有着相对主义和建构主义色彩的科学史和科学社会学的发展。理论选择的传统哲学说明遭到拒斥,而社会学说明获得优先地位,科学哲学开始远离认识论和形而上学的核心问题。不可通约性论题是对实证主义更为激进的背离,它在自我承诺意义上的所有明显影响,可被视为保守的和过时的。在科学哲学开始倾向于自然主义方法时,库恩思想中却出现了一种先验的方法;在其科学哲学的注意力从范式转移到不可通约性时,哲学的潮流再一次朝向了相反方向。在拒绝同时代科学哲学的一些方面时,库恩无意间让自己与实证主义保持一致。科学哲学对认知科学和人工智能已变得更顺应和开放,重新评价库恩所放弃的那些具有自然主义因素的思想的时机已到来。更多还原

【Abstract】 In the 1960 s,the relationship between philosophy of science and"core"philosophy,earlier so close,changed radically,Kuhn and his contemporaries raised other problems that were original to the philosophy of science,only to find the development of more or less relativistic and constructivistic history and sociology of science.Traditional philosophical explanations of theory choice are excluded,and sociological explanations take precedence.Philosophy of science further begins to distance from central concerns in epistemology and metaphysics.Incommensurability thesis can be seen as a far more radical departure from positivism,and for all the apparently dramatic implications of incommensurability,it can be seen as decidedly conservative and oldfashioned in its commitments,but Kuhn came close to breaking the mould.Ironically,just as philosophy of science was beginning to open itself up to naturalism,apriori approach occurred in Kuhn’s thought,and when Kuhn’s philosophy of science shifted its focus away from paradigms and onto incommensurability,again philosophical currents have been in the opposite direction.With increasing interest in cognitive science and artificial intelligence,paradigm-like notions,such as case-based reasoning,have become familiar to the relevant philosophers;when Kuhn rejected aspects of contemporary philosophy of science,he was unintentionally aligning himself more loosely to positivism.Precisely because philosophy of science has become more naturalized and more open to cognitive science and artificial intelligence,the time has come to reappraise those naturalistic elements of Kuhn’s thought that he himself abandoned.更多还原