【摘要】 近年来,随着第三方支付的迅速发展及规模的不断壮大,针对第三方支付的规制政策也不断出台。本文采用kane的金融创新与金融规制博弈理论思想,分析规制政策对第三方支付机构的影响,即分别在不同决策收益的情况下,第三方支付机构和规制当局的不同的策略选择。研究表明,如果政策采取简单地加重违规处罚力度,短期内有效。但是长期看,只是将规制机构的规制概率减少。但如果是加大对规制机构失职的惩处,则规制机构必定选择规制,这就迫使第三方支付机构减少违规的概率。更多还原

【Abstract】 In recent years, with the rapid development and growing scale of the third party payment,the regulation pol-icies are also continuing released. This paper adopts the Kane’s Financial Innovation and Regulation Game Theory to ana-lyze the regulation policy impact on third party payment agencies, namely, in the case of different decision-making inter-ests, the third party payment agencies andregulation authorities will choose different strategies. The research shows that ifthe policy simply increases punishment on violations, it’s useful in a short time. But in a long time, the regulation authori-ties will reduce the regulatory probabilities. If increasing punishments on the regulatory agencies, the regulation authoritieswill choose regulation which forces the third party payment agencies reducing violation probabilities.更多还原