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多任务视角下民营矿山企业安全投入激励模型的建立与分析

Establishment and analysis of private-operated mine enterprises safety investment incentive model based on multi-task principal-agent theory

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【作者】 王兴鹏吕淑然

【Author】 WANG Xing-peng;LV Shu-ran;School of Economics and Management,Shijiazhuang Tiedao University;School of Safety and Environmental Engineering,Capital University of Economics and Business;

【机构】 石家庄铁道大学经济管理学院首都经济贸易大学安全与环境工程学院

【摘要】 安全投入是企业安全生产的重要保障。针对民营矿山企业安全投入激励不足问题,本文运用多任务委托—代理理论建立了安全投入激励模型,分析了影响民营矿山企业安全投入的一系列因素,为政府制定有效的监管政策和激励机制提供参考。主要结论:1利用经济杠杆加大对企业安全投入的监管力度;2适当弱化对企业生产投入工作的激励;3增强企业经营者安全也是效益的意识;4对不同风险偏好的企业经营者实施不同的的激励政策。

【Abstract】 Safety investment is an important guarantee of enterprises safety production.Aiming at the problem of the insufficient safety investment in private mining enterprises,this paper establishes a safety investment incentive model based on multi-task principal-agent theory,analyzes the factors influencing safety investment of private mining enterprise,and provides advice for local government in order to make supervision policies and design effective incentive mechanism.Main conclusions:1 Strengthen the supervision and control efforts to improve enterprise safety investment using the economic instruments;2Weaken the incentive of enterprise productive work appropriately;3 Enhance enterprise operator’s awareness that safety is benefit;4Implement different incentives to the different enterprise operators according to their risk appetite.

  • 【文献出处】 中国矿业 ,China Mining Magazine , 编辑部邮箱 ,2016年03期
  • 【分类号】F426.1
  • 【被引频次】3
  • 【下载频次】132
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