【摘要】 本文从中央政府的角度出发,分析了污染治理的外部性会带来市场的非效率,研究了地方政府污染联控机制在占优均衡与子博弈精炼纳什均衡下的执行问题。研究发现:市场效率损失来源于私有信息与机制设计者的监管力度不够,得到了纳什均衡下机制执行的充分必要条件,并构建了一个动态机制来实现污染联控问题,同时通过非对称信息的引入,给出了占优均衡下机制实现目标的方式。更多还原

【Abstract】 From the perspective of the central government,linear and nonlinear joint control mechanisms of pollution under the complete and incomplete information are designed based on the heterogeneity of local government. It is found that: incomplete information will affect the the optimal penalties of joint control mechanism,and the linear punishment of pollution emission does not achieve the market efficiency;In joint control mechanism design of pollution,the central government should increase the penalties of low type of local government,and properly reduce the penalties of high type local government. Also,the central government in order to obtain high type local government’s private information,and the information cost of payment is mainly undertaken by low type of local government.更多还原