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建筑工人参与安全管理演化博弈研究

Research on evolutionary game for construction workers participation in safety management

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【作者】 王旭峰刘毅邱坤南沈斐敏

【Author】 WANG Xufeng;LIU Yi;QIU Kunnan;SHEN Feimin;College of Civil Engineering, Fuzhou University;College of Environmental & Resources, Fuzhou University;

【机构】 福州大学土木工程学院福州大学环境与资源学院

【摘要】 为提高建筑施工全员安全管理水平,运用演化博弈理论研究特定群体结构的工人参与安全管理意愿。以二维三角晶格复杂网络表征工人群体结构。从公共物品博弈角度,构建建筑工人参与安全管理演化博弈模型。对不同增益系数、噪声强度及合作者初始分布情况下模型的演化进行数值模拟。结果表明:群体结构对博弈结果起重要作用,提高增益系数与噪声强度对工人选择合作策略分别起促进和阻碍作用,合作者初始分布影响演化过程中团簇结构的形成。可通过提高工人个体对安全行为投资效益的理性认识来增强工人参与安全管理的意愿。

【Abstract】 To promote the implementation of whole staff safety management in construction, the willingness to participate in safety management of workers of specific group structure was studied using the evolutionary game theory. A two-dimensional triangular lattice network was used to indicate the group structure of workers. An evolutionary game model was built for construction workers participation in safety management from the viewpoint of the classic public goods game theory. Evolution of the game was numerically simulated with different gain coefficients, noise intensities and the initial distribution of collaborators. Results show that the group structure plays an important role in the outcome of the game, that increase in gain coefficient and that in noise intensity promotes and obstructs respectively choosing of cooperative strategy, that the initial distribution of collaborators influences the formation of clusters in the evolution process.,and that workers’ willingness to participate in safety management can be enhanced by individuals’ the individual rational knowledge of investment benefit of safety behavior.

【基金】 国家自然科学基金资助(51304051);福建省自然科学基金资助(2012J05088)
  • 【文献出处】 中国安全科学学报 ,China Safety Science Journal , 编辑部邮箱 ,2016年04期
  • 【分类号】TU714
  • 【被引频次】12
  • 【下载频次】610
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