【摘要】 文章是在党的十八届三中全会关于深化国有企业改革的背景下,对国企高管薪酬制度改革的实践评价和理论探索。由于委托代理理论关于高管薪酬决定机制逻辑上的问题,国资委对央企负责人的业绩考核,以及薪酬管理在目标上和措施上存在一定的问题。从企业本质上说,高管薪酬是一个企业收益的分配问题,是股东(或董事会)和高管之间就人力资本讨价还价的结果,所以高管薪酬的治理要求在两者之间建立平衡的权力结构。国有企业的分类改革、混合所有制改革,以及国有资产管理体制的改革,为调整这一权力结构提供了契机。高管薪酬制度的完善要从权利配置、岗位职责,以及激励机制上平衡国有资产监管机构和国有资本投资、运营公司董事会之间的权力机构,以及混合所有制国有企业董事会和高管之间的权力结构。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper is about the reform evaluation and theoretical exploration of the SOE corporate executive compensation system reform under the background of the Third Plenary Session of the 18 th CPC Central Committee on comprehensively deepening reforms. Because of the logic of the principal-agent theory on executive salary decision mechanism,there are some problems on the target and measures of SASAC(State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission) with regard to the performance appraisal and compensation management of central enterprises. Executive compensation is a problem of profit distribution from the aspect of enterprise’s nature and is the result of bargaining over human capital between shareholders(board of directors) and executives,so that the governance of executive compensation requires to establish a balanced power structure between shareholders(board of directors) and executives. An opportunity to adjust the power structure is provided by the classified reform,mixed ownership reform and the reform of the management system of state-owned assets and state-owned enterprises. In order to improve executive compensation system,the power structure must be balanced between state-owned assets regulators and state-owned board of directors and between board of directors and executives in mixed ownership stateowned enterprises in terms of right deployment,post responsibility and incentive mechanism.更多还原