【摘要】 对现有量子签名方案进行安全分析有助于评估量子签名的安全性、发现潜在漏洞和修复漏洞,因此,本文构造了一类有效的合谋攻击,并指出了一类量子同态签名方案在该合谋攻击下是不安全的.在此攻击中,发送者只需通过合谋巧妙地改变所签的消息即可实现抵赖,并从纠缠交换和签名验证两个方面分析了此类合谋攻击奏效的主要原因.该签名方案验证纠缠交换后的签名的状态并不能够验证单个消息的源,从而使得该签名方案不安全.更多还原

【Abstract】 A cryptanalysis of existing signature schemes can help to evaluate their security level, find potential loopholes and fix security flaws. This paper constructs a class of effective colluding attacks and shows that a class of quantum homomorphic signature schemes under the attacks is not secure. In such colluding attacks, the signers can disavow their signatures by colluding to change their messages. Moreover, the paper also analyzes the main reasons why the colluding attacks are effective from two aspects: the entanglement swapping and the signature verification. The signature state in the schemes after being verified and exchanged cannot verify the individual sources of the messages and thereby make the signature schemes insecure.更多还原