【摘要】 研究了委托人与代理人双边过度自信倾向及风险厌恶偏好情形下的委托-代理问题.结论表明最优风险分担水平随着委托人风险厌恶程度及代理人过度自信水平的增大而增加,随着代理人风险厌恶程度和委托人过度自信水平的减少而减少.最优努力水平随代理人风险厌恶程度及委托人过度自信水平的增大而提高,随委托人风险厌恶程度和代理人过度自信水平的减少而减少.更多还原

【Abstract】 In this paper,we study the principal-agent problem in the case of principal and agent bilateral overconfidence and risk aversion.The conclusions show that the optimal risksharing coefficient is an increasing function of the principal’s risk aversion and the agents’ overconfidence level,is a decreasing function of the agents’ risk aversion and the principal’s overconfidence level.The optimal level of effort is a decreasing function of the agents’ risk aversion and principal’s overconfidence level,is an increasing function of the principal’s risk aversion and the agent’s overconfidence level.更多还原