【摘要】 检验了IFRS的强制采用对应计与真实盈余管理的影响,并进一步探讨了投资者保护在此过程中所扮演的角色。利用来自28个强制采用IFRS的国家和地区2001-2008年数据,研究发现:第一,强制采用IFRS后,公司应计盈余管理程度增大,真实盈余管理程度减小;第二,与直接强制采用IFRS的国家和地区相比,在间接强制采用IFRS的国家和地区,公司应计盈余管理更多、真实盈余管理更少;第三,在投资者保护更好的国家和地区,强制采用IFRS之后应计盈余管理显著增加;第四,在投资者保护更好的国家和地区,与直接强制采用IFRS的国家和地区相比,在间接强制采用IFRS的国家和地区,公司的应计盈余管理更少;第五,良好的投资者保护可以抑制应计盈余管理行为,但是对真实盈余管理行为几乎没有影响。更多还原

【Abstract】 This study examines the effect of mandatory adoption of IFRS on the accrualbased and real earnings management and further explores how the investor protection affects the above relationship. With the data of 28 nations and regions forced to adopt IFRS from2001 to 2008,the following findings are shown. First,after the mandatory use of IFRS,the accrual-based earnings management is increased while the real earnings management is decreased. Second,compared with those nations and regions directly adopting IFRS by force,in the nations and regions indirectly adopting it,the accrual-based earnings management is increased more and the real earnings management is reduced more. Third,in nations and regions with better investor protection,after the mandatory adoption of IFRS,the accrual-based earnings management is significantly increased. Fourth, in nations and regions with better investor protection,compared with those nations and regions directly adopting IFRS by force,in the nations and regions indirectly adopting it,the real earnings management is reduced more. Finally,the good investor protection suppresses the accrualbased earnings management,but has little impact on the real earnings management.更多还原