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微分博弈下政府税收与企业再投资的互动策略研究

Interaction between government tax and enterprise reinvestment based on differential game theory

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【作者】 徐晟夏宝藏唐庭正

【Author】 XU Sheng;XIA Baocang;TANG Tingzheng;School of Management,Hefei University of Technology;

【机构】 合肥工业大学管理学院

【摘要】 文章以Solow增长模型中的新古典生产函数为基础,结合随机微分理论和动态博弈理论,将政府税率和企业再投资率设为内生变量,构建了政府-企业博弈系统,分析了政府税收和企业再投资最优策略,并通过数值方法分析了现实经济问题。

【Abstract】 Based on the new classical production function of Solow growth model,the stochastic differential theory and the dynamic game theory,the game system between the government and enterprises is built,in which the government tax rate and the enterprise reinvestment rate are set as endogenous variable.The optimal strategies of the government tax and the enterprise reinvestment are analyzed,and the economic reality is studied by using the numerical model.

  • 【文献出处】 合肥工业大学学报(自然科学版) ,Journal of Hefei University of Technology(Natural Science) , 编辑部邮箱 ,2016年10期
  • 【分类号】F275;F810.42;F224.32
  • 【下载频次】153
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