【摘要】 国有企业CEO同时具备"经济人"和"政治人"特征,这意味着仅从薪酬激励设计角度研究国有企业创新犹如管中窥豹,在建设创新型国家的时代背景下,国有企业CEO政治晋升激励可能是影响国有企业创新活动的另一机制。本文采用2007~2014年间国有上市公司CEO变更数据,研究了国有企业高管政治晋升激励对企业创新的影响。结果显示:政治晋升激励使得国有企业CEO更加专注有效的研发投入,在降低研发投入量的基础上,提高了企业创新产出。其次,我们探讨了国有企业政治晋升激励可能存在的"面子工程"和"真才实干"两种机制,发现政治晋升激励不仅提高了企业创新投入产出率,而且提高了创新产出的价值增值能力,支持了政治晋升激励下CEO创新"真才实干"假说。最后,我们进一步研究了薪酬激励、在职消费对创新的政治晋升激励有效性的调节作用。研究发现,相对于低薪酬激励,高薪酬激励时国有企业CEO创新的政治晋升激励有效性更高;相对于高在职消费,低在职消费时国有企业CEO创新的政治晋升激励有效性更高。更多还原

【Abstract】 CEO in State-owned enterprises has the characteristics of "economic man" and "political man" at the same time,which means itis not enough to research the innovation incentive from the compensation incentive design. Under the background of constructing innovative countries, political promotion incentives might be another mechanism to explain the innovation activities in SOEs. Using a CEO turnover sample of state-owned listed companies during the period of2007 to 2014, this paper studies the relationship between political promotion incentive and the innovation activity in SOEs, the result shows: political promotion incentives makes CEO focus more effective R&D investment,with no increasing in R&D input, which improve the enterprise innovation output.Secondly, we discuss two mechanisms "face project" and "true talent" and we find that with the action of political promotion incentives, the market value to innovation output is increased, which verifies the "true talent" hypothesis. Finally, by comparing the mutual relations between compensation incentive, perks and political promotion in state-owned enterprises innovative activities, we find the political promotion incentive is more effective with higher compensation and lower perks.更多还原